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This article examines the way in which the EU has moved beyond its traditional, cold war role, and
has extended its role in the sphere of security policies. Enlargement to the east and south is one of
the most effective ways in which the EU can extend its influence, and through which it can help to
create a zone of security, peace and prosperity in Europe. However, the focus of this article is not
upon enlargement itself, but the growth of the EU's role as a provider of security beyond its existing
frontiers. The characteristics of international institutions are best understood through three levels of
analysis: the international system, the individual states, and institutions themselves The fall of the
iron curtain has created a changed international environment, and the opportunity for European
international institutions to extend their membership, to alter and enhance their roles, and to
influence the politics of their members. The EU has sought to project economic security through
trade, and to exercise a political and diplomatic role beyond its borders. During the cold war, the
allies on both sides of the Atlantic relied upon national defence and NATO to protect their territo-
ries. With the end of the cold war, both NATO and the EU were inevitably forced to re-examine their
roles and raison d 'etre. Within the EC, the process of adaptation was different, as member states
first wanted to consolidate their existing policy programme, including EMU.
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1. Introduction
To say that international institutions matter,
is a truism for Europeans. The characteristics of in-
ternational institutions are best understood through
three levels of analysis. First, the international sys-
tem shapes and frames the structure and member-
ship of international institutions - during the cold
war, membership of Western international institutions
was virtually impossible. Second, individual states,
acting in their perceived national interests, or believ-
ing that better outcomes can be realised for them-
selves, create and then change international institu-
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tions. Individual states are also shaped by their mem-
bership of institutions, as priorities, loyalties, and
even domestic politics are altered when they join and
participate in the working of these institutions. Third,
institutions themselves can adapt, and play an un-
predictable role in international political life, by re-
inforcing their norms and rules, by creating an inter-
national presence, and through their international
secretariats. In the case of the European Union (EU),
both the Commission and the European Court of Jus-
tice play key based roles to ensure compliance with
the Treaties, and to assert their own presence.
Since the end of the cold war, all these power-
ful forces have been at work in Europe. The fall of
the iron curtain has created a changed international
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environment, and the opportunity for European in-
ternational institutions to extend their membership,
to alter and enhance their roles, and to influence the
politics oftheir members. States have been very will-
ing to act through institutions. Institutions have been
competing between themselves for influence. This
article will examine the way in which the EU has
moved beyond its traditional, cold war role, and has
extended its role in the sphere of security policies.
Enlargement to the east and south is one of the most
effective ways in which the EU can extend its influ-
ence, and through which it can help to create a zone
of security, peace and prosperity in Europe. How-
ever, the focus of this article is not upon enlarge-
ment itself, but the growth of the EU's role as a pro-
vider of security beyond its existing frontiers.
As we shall see, the EU has sought to project
economic security through trade, and to exercise a
political and diplomatic role beyond its borders.
However, since the famous Anglo-French summit of
December 1998 that was held in St Malo, France,
the EU has been working towards a military dimen-
sion. This process will be quickly outlined. Its con-
sequences, first for the EU as a security provider,
and also for its relations with other international in-
stitutions will then be assessed, although the exact
configuration of the changes that St Malo implies
will take time to become clear. Militarising the EU
ends one of the last policy taboos of a 'civilian-
power' EU and breaks through the 'glass ceiling' of
its self-denying ordinance against the adoption of the
instruments of military force, a 'glass ceiling' which
has existed since its inception. This article suggests
that the last two years represent the rather messy birth
of a post-cold war pan European defence and secu-
rity regime. Institutional, and inter-institutional ar-
guments have characterised these years. But if the
EU's security agenda is to be driven by policy con-
cerns, and not institutional constraints; and if the full
toolbox of European policy instruments is to be ef-
fectively applied, the arrangements reached so far
will not truly be adequate for the task.
2. What is the change?
To begin with a little history. Since its crea-
tion in 1957, one defining characteristic of the EEC
has been that it is a purely civilian power. It has de-
veloped in this way in part because of a scarring at-
tempt to build a West European military force within
the NATO framework that foundered in 1954, de-
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spite four years of agonising diplomacy. It then
seemed clear that defence would remain well out-
side the remit of the EEC, although external trade
matters were dealt with within the Treaty base. In-
deed, it was not until the early 1970s that a mecha-
nism to coordinate foreign policy positions was cre-
ated. This was strictly informal, outside the Treaty
base, and had no brief for defence issues, even when,
in the Single European Act of 1987, this informal
procedure was given a small secretariat.
During the cold war, the allies on both sides
of the Atlantic relied upon national defence, and
NATO to protect their territories. This was under-
stood and favoured by the Europeans, and indeed it
created a comfortable situation that actually suited
Europeans and their Atlantic partners very well, de-
spite occasional spats. Since the end of the cold war,
the ratchet of European defence has been tighten-
ing, as the changes in the Maastricht and Amster-
dam treaties have shown. The reasons behind the
events of the last two years are complicated, do not
admit of a mono-casual explanation, and do not fit
neatly into any explanatory theoretical model, but
reflect the three levels of analysis referred to above.
They result from the consequences of the shifting
international system since 1989; the slow and ago-
nising disintegration of the old Yugoslav Rcpubl ic;
the cumulative effects of the long term, but tentative
efforts to empower the ECI EU and the process of
role redefinition of international institutions; and the
decision by the two key hard-power actors, Britain
and France, to shift their policies in this area.
Before 1989, most European members of
NATO were also members of Western European
Union (WEU), but this institution had no effective
military competencies, and its membership was not
conterminous with the EU. With the end of the cold
war, both NATO and the EU were inevitably forced
to re-examine their roles and raison d'etre. WEU was
irredeemably squeezed as a competitive energy be-
tween the EU and NATO developed. ATO defined
its new strategic concept; proposed an outreach
policy to east-central Europe through the orth At-
lantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for
Peace programme; discussed the establishment of
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), in which coa-
litions of the willing could perform non-territorial
defence tasks without involving the whole NATO
machinery; and finally enlarged to Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic in early 1999.
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Within the EC, the process of adaptation was
different, as member states first wanted to consoli-
date their existing policy programme, including
EMU. The framers of the Maastricht, and then the
Amsterdam treaties were also concerned to
strengthen and to give European foreign policy a
clearer remit, which was achieved by creating in the
Maastricht Treaty the Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy (CFSP) as an intergovernmental pillar.
The Maastricht Treaty also allowed for requests to
be made by the EU's European Council to the WEU
for military action. In the Amsterdam treaty, this pro-
vision was fleshed out by reference to the Petersberg
Tasks. These important tasks: humanitarian and res-
cue tasks, peace-keeping, and tasks of combat forces
in crisis management including peace-making, were
framed by WEU in 1992, and have proved to be a
benchmark for what military security work the Eu-
ropeans might wish to undertake. The potential, even-
tually, for European defence was included in the trea-
ties, and the Amsterdam Treaty referred 'to the pos-
sibility of the integration of the WEU into the Un-
ion, should the European Council so decide', al-
though it also confirmed existing obligations to the
common defence secured within NATO. A question
of a direct EU military capability was not addressed.
Then, in the autumn and winter of 1998, the
Europeans made firmer declarations on this issue.
On 8 December 1998, at a bilateral summit in Saint-
Malo, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French
President Jacques Chirac, dropped a diplomatic
bombshell. The Saint-Malo declaration said that:
"The European Union needs to be in a posi-
tion to play its full role on the international stage.
This means making a reality of the Treaty of Am-
sterdam which will provide the essential basis for
action by the Union ... To this end, the Union must
have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by
credible, military forces, the means to decide to use
them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to
international crises ... acting in conformity with our
respective obligations to NATO."
The declaration emphasised the leadership of
the two EU powers with the greatest military capa-
bilities, but it also created a diplomatic storm, and it
has been privately admitted that the ground was not
well enough prepared with the Americans before St
Malo. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
wrote publicly in the Financial Times of the dangers
to NATO of the declaration, sending a broadside
across the bows of the British and the French, re-
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minding them of the dangers of the duplication of
resources, of discrimination against those powers that
were not in the EU, and of decoupling - that is, un-
picking the carefully crafted NATO Alliance. Fur-
ther, the joint declaration did not really represent a
joint policy, and the French remained suspicious that
the British were trying to bring them back into the
NATO fold, while some Britons feared that the
progress of the St Malo initiative might unintention-
ally weaken NATO, and deliver unintended conse-
quences in relation to the ED.
Less than four months later, the air strikes over
Kosovo began. American planes carried out more
than 80% of the air raids, although the Europeans
had over 6,000 aircraft. When it came to putting to-
gether the peacekeeping force, Europe struggled to
provide 40,000 troops, even though this figure was
roughly one fiftieth of its armed force. The Euro-
pean partners in the alliance were found to be un-
able to playa role commensurate with that of the
United States. As the then British Defence Minister
George Robertson put it: "you had sweat and strain
all your resources to get a deployable 2 per cent of
the totality. That will not be tolerable in the future
... we clearly need more of those paper troops to be
deployable, flexible, survivable, sustainable." This
was the more alarming, given that, since the Strate-
gic Concept of 1991, NATO had recognised that the
nature of conflict envisaged during the cold war was
now out of date, but that it was only with great diffi-
culty that NATO could actually deploy the range of
forces and hardware that it did in what was clearly a
post- cold war type of operation. The NATO Euro-
pean partners who were members of the EU were
tested and found wanting. Indeed, NATO very nearly
failed to conduct a successful, post-cold war secu-
rity operation.
During the air strikes, two important meetings
were held, both of which gave shape to a potentially
important change in EU-NATO relations, as they
confirmed the possibility of the EU developing an
autonomous military capacity, as expressed at St
Malo. The first of these was the NATO Washington
Summit, held in April 1999, and the second was the
Cologne EU Summit, held even as the air strikes
ended, in June 1999. No European standing army
was proposed, but rather a Military Security Pool
(MSP), numbering around 60,000, which could be
raised and deployed for Petersberg, non-Article 5,
tasks was agreed to. Such a force would act on the
instructions of the EU's supreme body, the European
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Council, and these tasks would be performed with
the agreement of NATO, and if necessary, with the
use of NATO assets. At the same time, The Defence
Capabilities Initiative (launched in Washington),
proposed adaptations to conform to the New Strate-
gic Concept, looking particularly at command and
control, information systems, interoperability and
standardisation, deployability, and the military ca-
pability of European allies. On the back of the De-
fence Capabilities Initiative, it was thus possible to
repackage the earlier St Malo European initiative in
the context of capabilities rather than a European
defence identity. At Cologne, it was also agreed that
the WEU should indeed be folded into the EU, and a
new decision-making structure was now proposed
which would include the involvement of ministers
of defence within the Union to take forward the
Anglo-French project proposed at Saint-Malo. Wash-
ington and Cologne thus built upon earlier propos-
als, but were also sharpened and no doubt speeded
up because the Kosovo air strikes had shown a need
to re-examine both military structure and military
capability.
The Kosovo conflict acted as the spur, but was
not the cause of the re-balancing of European-Ameri-
can relations in the military sector. By the time that
the air strikes had ended, the EU had therefore taken
the quantum leap to give itself the potential to em-
brace a military role, albeit only to deal with
Petersberg tasks. The sanctity of the Union's civil-
ian role had ended. In this it had secured a NATO
blessing, albeit a rather reluctant one.
3. The Common European
Security and Defence Policy
(CESDP)
I. Western European Union (WEU) will be
brought to an end as a functioning international or-
ganisation, either totally, or in part. WEU will not
be completely dismantled, because of the complexi-
ties of what to do about Article V, because of pres-
sure from its Assembly, and because of the difficul-
ties of re-writing sections of the Amsterdam Treaty
that this would involve. The Treaty of Nice there-
fore deals with the EU's new role, rather than the
future shelf life of WEU. .
2. The Council of the European Union will be
able to take decisions on the whole range of politi-
cal, economic and military instruments at its disposal
when responding to crisis situations. As the Union
is developing a common policy on security and de-
fence with' a capacity for autonomous action backed
up by credible military capabilities and appropriate
decision-making bodies,' regular (or ad hoc) meet-
ings of the General Affairs Council, as appropriate,
including, for the first time, Defence Ministers are
established. A Political and Security Committee
(PSC/ COPS; a continuation of the former Political
Committee) composed of national representatives at
senior! ambassadorial level operates under the au-
thority of the European Council, but without any
prejudice to Community competence. It will direct
any military operations. An Military Committee
(MC) has now been created, composed of the Chiefs
of Defence, which would give military advice, and
make recommendations to the PSC, and the Chair of
this committee would be entitled to attend Council
meetings if necessary. Military Staff (MS) from the
EU member states would provide expertise, support,
situation assessment and strategic planning for
Petersberg tasks.
3. It has been agreed that countries which are not
members of the EU but which might wish to partici-
pate should be involved in decision-making both up-
stream, and down stream. This includes both states
which are members of NATO, and those which are
not. The Russian response to the military initiative
has been quite warm. However, the core decision on
using military force is to be made by the Council
alone. The decision-making associated with this ex-
ercise is to be taken in conformity with the EU's own
procedures, both ensuring consistency and coherence
(Article 3 of the EU treaty), and allowing for equal-
ity of treatment for all states.
4. The Amsterdam treaty created a new official
position: that of the High Representative of the CFSP,
who was to give the CFSP a stronger administrative
and international profile - 'the chief spin doctor of
the EU's foreign policy', complete with early warn-
ing planning staff. The High Representative is the
Secretary-General of the Foreign Affairs Council,
and he is assisted by a policy planning and early
warning unit, intended to give greater coherence to
CFSP and the capacity to respond quickly to crises.
The new High Representative is Javier Solana, for-
merly the Secretary General of NATO. In November
1999, he was also given the job of Secretary-Gen-
eral of WEU. This represents only one manifcsta-
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tion of double-hatting between national, NATO and
WEU personnel.
5. A common European Headline Goal, or MSP,
has been adopted for readily deployable military ca-
pabilities, and collective capability goals in the fields
of command and control, intelligence and strategic
transport to be formulated through voluntarily co-
ordinated national and multinational efforts for the
Peters berg tasks agenda. The EU will have the power
to send troops to confront security situations as set
out in the Peters berg Tasks. An inventory of tools
available has been drawn up, based on a WEU audit.
The tasks would be carried through under the aus-
pices of a lead agency like NATO or the UN, or,
'where appropriate, in autonomous EU actions'. By
2003, co-operating together voluntarily, the EU
would be able to deploy rapidly and then to sustain
forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks
in operations up, to corps level (15 brigades, or
50000-60000 persons). The forces should be
militarily self-sustaining with the necessary com-
mand control and intelligence capabilities, logistics,
other combat support services and, as appropriate,
air and naval elements. These should be deployable
within 60 days, and also have smaller units ready for
even quicker deployment. Forces should be able to
remain in the field for at least a year (requiring prepa-
ration for closer to 200,000 troops). The need for
co-ordinated monitoring and early warning mecha-
nisms; greater openness of existing joint national
headquarters; greater reinforcement of existing mul-
tinational rapid reaction facilities (ARRF, Eurocorps
included); a European air transport command and
strategic sea life capacity has also been noted. The
November Capabilities Conference decided upon the
allocation of forces that will be made available. It is
centred around those to be provided by EU states,
but others have also made a commitment to the
project.
These changes have been introduced with the
support of NATO, and in parallel to NATO's own
re-structuring. Within the NATO framework, the
Washington Summit launched the Defence Capabili-
ties Initiative (DCI). It proposed adaptations to con-
form to the New Strategic Concept: Thus EU mem-
ber states are developing their capability (including
headquarters) for Petersberg operations. The main
areas to be addressed are deployability, sustainability,
interoperability, flexibility and mobility. National
command structures and existing command struc-
tures within the existing multinational forces (infor-
mally developed, and including, for example the
Eurocorps) will be used. This exercise should be
jointly and co-operatively carried forward, involv-
ing national commitment, NATO and PfP/ WEU as-
sociates, and the EU, while being 'mutually reinforc-
ing' to NATO's own DCI. The intention is that NATO
resources will be used as and when appropriate, al-
though, at this stage, the exact formulation and com-
position of these changes is not made explicit. The
need for more progress in European procurement and
the harmonisation of military requirements had been
flagged at St Malo and was re-iterated.
6. These changes are being made by the EU in
the context of the development of non-military forms
of security, including cooperation with Non-Govern-
mental Organisations. A proposal to create a 5000
strong policing unit has now been approved.
Several points need to be emphasised here.
First is that the Military Security Pool is not a Euro-
pean Army, or really even a rapid reaction force, but
is a pool of military resources which can be gath-
ered together in the configurations required for non-
territorial defence activities, from those countries -
in or out ofthe EU, and from both sides of the Atlan-
tic and presumably beyond - that wish to partici-
pate. Second - the system is inter-governmental in
nature, and there is no proposal on the table as yet
that this should be changed. A third point has been
emphasised over and over again: this is not devised
to challenge NATO in terms of responsibilities (Ar-
ticle 5, or CJTFs), hardware (that of the US - NATO
has very little dedicated hardware), or membership
(US, Canada, Turkey, Iceland, Norway, Poland,
Czech Republic, Hungary), but is rather an attempt
to allowEl.J states to respond militarily to non-terri-
torial defence based security challenges - as identi-
fied by the Petersberg tasks. The North Atlantic
Council meeting of 15 December 1999 referred to
NATO's European Pillar, and the development of
'modalities for EUINATO relations' .... We note that
this process will avoid unnecessary duplication and
does not imply the creation of a European army'.
Fourth, the policy question - how will we know when
to use it?, or is security indivisible and global? - has
been less well addressed than the institutional ques-
tions - and this relates both to the geographical area,
and to the policy-making context. The addition of a
military dimension to the EU is much more than sim-
ply adding another policy area to its competence. A
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Rubicon in the development of the EU is being
crossed, though these changes may yet have to be
addressed in the context of another IGC and subse-
quent Treaty revisions.
4. Is European security
indivisible?
There is currently a fragmentation of the Un-
ion's external profile which reflects historical devel-
opments, rather than a clear overall sense of what
constitutes external, let alone security policy. Today,
Pillar I of the EU deals inter alia with external trade
and economic provisions and enlargement, and is
overseen by four Commissioners, Chris Patten, for
External Relations, with the Commissioners for
Trade (Pascal Lamy), for Development and Humani-
tarian Aid, (Poul Nielsen), and Enlargement (GUnter
Verheugen), as joint key actors. In Pillar I activity,
the Commission plays a leading role, proposing poli-
cies and ensuring their implementation; while ap-
proval for most policies is conducted through a com-
plicated system of qualified majority voting. Pillar
III, Justice and Home Affairs, deals with matters re-
lating to security within the EU, operating on a largely
inter-governmental and informal basis. Pillar II ac-
tivity - the CFSP - operates through joint actions
and common positions, and, since the Amsterdam
Treaty, common strategies. After Maastricht, the
European Council could ask WEU to implement ac-
tions that require military force, under the terms of
the Petersberg Tasks. The EU Foreign Affairs Coun-
cil - composed of member states' foreign ministers
- is responsible for securing the implementation of
common policies, and can further recommend new
common strategies to the European Council. When
the European Council unanimously approves a com-
mon strategy, then qualified majority voting by the
Foreign Affairs Council can be used to implement
it. So, procedurally, it is possible to proceed by a
qualified majority vote, with measures approved by
the European Council, with the dual safeguards of
so-called constructive abstention, and the possibil-
ity of referring a decision back to the European Coun-
cil if a state resorts to a veto on an action. The Com-
mission is not excluded from the CFSP framework,
and has a role through its international representa-
tive functions, its right to initiate policy suggestions,
and through its participation in the implementation
of actions. CFSP work is currently funded through
the Community budget. So the notion of inter-
governmentalism in Pillar II is only a partially accu-
rate nomenclature, as on the one hand, with Euro-
pean Council prior consent, qualified majority is then
allowed, and, on the other, the Commission (which
represents the interests of the EU, not its individual
member states) is not excluded from the process al-
together as a player. Clearly, the consent of the Eu-
ropean Council preserves the rights of states not to
be drawn into policy actions with which they might
profoundly disagree. But at the same time, the Com-
mission has a treaty obligation to ensure coherence
across policies. This partial inter-governmentalism
remains an important point, and reflects consider-
ably greater status for the Commission in external
relations than existed twenty years ago. We must
consider whether inter-governmental axioms will be
sustained, or whether militarising the EU will mean
greater pressure to produce more policy coherence
and a greater role for the Commission - a classic
spill-over effect.
It will be difficult to draw lines in the sand
between Commission activity, and state activity
within Pillar Two. There are both policy and institu-
tional reasons for this. First is the nature of what is
meant by security, and how this fits in with the
Peters berg tasks, given that the EU is defining itself
as a security, as well as an economic organisation.
Security is an elusive term. It is clear, even from the
Petersberg definition, that security is not just about
violence and the application of military instruments.
It covers environmental, criminality, humanitarian
and human rights issues, as well as those of the ille-
gitimate use of violence. In terms ofEU policy mak-
ing, it is clear that many of the instruments that can
be used to try and secure security are those which
already belong to the Commission, including eco-
nomic instruments, humanitarian aid, sanctions, and
enlargement.
It is also not possible to separate internal and
external security. All that goes on relating to exter-
nal policy has a double function. A unified external
policy has to co-exist with the difficult task of estab-
lishing and sustaining the solidarity of the member
states in the EU (as well as each state's own national
domestic consensus) : thus there is always a double
agenda - the projection of security, and the parallel
consolidation of both the consent and the security of
the participants as players within the system. To
project security, the Union must itself be secure.
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Some of the debates about the projection of security
power were rehearsed by Tony Blair during the
Kosovo air strikes, in his Chicago speech of April
1999.
It is obvious that, if security threats are multi-
dimensional, then many different instruments to deal
with them need to be easily available. Many of the
instruments that can be used to try and secure secu-
rity are those which already belong to the Commis-
sion in Pillar I. As explained, the Commission has a
fairly robust role as an institution when we consider
the EU's external policy overall, even discounting
the extreme statements that have been by Commis-
sion President Prodi. Since its conception, the Com-
munity has been acquiring greater competences.
Whilst much of the early writing on 'spill-over' was
discredited by events, particularly during the 1970s,
the Commission received a boost to its capacity to
act with the Single European Act. Now, within Pil-
lar II the Commission has the right, but not the sole
right, to propose initiatives, and to sit in at Council
meetings on CFSP, and to ensure implementation. It
is arguable that the EU, led by the Commission, may
yet reduce what Christopher Hill has called the 'ca-
pabilities-expectation' gap in the security sphere,
without openly challenging the sacredness of the in-
ter-governmental Council decision to use military
force when operating through Pillar II.
Significantly, Commissioner Chris Patten has
also recently argued on these lines, pointing out that
the EU has been reinforcing the non-military instru-
ments of crisis management in areas from the build-
ing of democratic institutions, to promoting the rule
of law and the good functioning of justice, police
and border control, to control of illicit trafficking
and arms control. He has 'an expansive view of the
scope of the Commission to contribute ideas and
proposals, whether or not it has the exclusive right
of initiative, with the aim of ensuring a single and
coherent EU position on the major international is-
sues of the day', including those which might in-
clude Petersberg tasks. He has set up a central plan-
ning staff for external relations under his authority
(a Commission Crisis Centre) to ensure effective co-
operation with Solana's policy planning and early
warning unit, and an official from the Commission
is seconded to Solana's unit to 'ensure good links'.
To support a European operational capacity, he sig-
nals the Commission's potential to progress with a
European armaments policy: 'we could look at ways
of creating a single armament policy in the EU. This
could require Community action on opening up de-
fence procurement, competition rules, research pro-
grammes, import duties and export controls', within
the context of more effective defence spending on
upgraded armed forces. The Commission, 'with its
own restructuring, has shown that it, too, is deter-
mined to step up a gear - or two, or three.' Non-
military headline goals, to match the military ones
are being developed, which would allow the EU to
mobilise its own resources for EU, UN or OSCE
actions in areas such as policing, mine-clearance and
mediation.
It is clear that the CESDP will not quickly
become like any other Union policy arena - its Pil-
lar II framework, the need for unanimity in the Eu-
ropean Council guarantees, the preferences ofmem-
ber states in this most state-like role of exercising
military power, and the apparently declining salience
of the Commission guarantees that. But the responses
required for security issues are often unclear and
controversial, and the timing of these responses is
even more difficult to gauge. The moment at which
non-military forms of intervention may need to be
supported, or supplanted by military forms is not easy
to judge, (this is also true for a moment when 'secu-
rity' becomes 'defence'). The Commission remains
the only permanent bureaucracy to monitor and act
across all external policy, whether in Pillar I or Pil-
lar II. There can be no doubt that the fungibility of
the boundaries between the Pillars will be increas-
ingly challenged, as the indivisibility of external ac-
tions in the realm of security become more appar-
ent. Thus, the increasing participation of the Com-
mission in the military-security dimension is insti-
tutionally logical to ensure as effective decision-
making as possible, although this remains politically
unacceptable. The Pillar system is not set in con-
crete.
5. The EU and other security
institutions in Europe
It has been argued that the EU 'is called on -
and wants - to be the framework around which all of
Europe reorganises itself for a peaceful and prosper-
ous future', that it is 'the only game in town', for
Europeans. What can we learn from the EU's rela-
tionship with other European international institu-
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tions? Is it a predator, despite the overlapping mem-
bership between international institutions?
6. WEU
The decision that has been taken to wind down
WEU may at first sight be considered one that has
been a long time coming, and is long overdue. WEU,
which was created in 1954 from the Brussels Treaty,
and whose membership was only open to certain
NATO members, had been the sole purely European
defence organisation, and, although swamped by
NATO since its foundation, has performed a number
of useful tasks, and has a stronger defence guarantee
than NATO itself. Since Maastricht, WEU has been
a pivot between the EU and NATO, providing, in
theory, services for the EU, while remaining a body
to which only European NATO members could as-
pire to full membership. At Amsterdam, its survival
was secured, although the possibility of an institu-
tional change was also flagged. Nevertheless, it had
until then been on a gradual downward path, never
having been endowed with a clear role, its capacity
to take on new members severely constrained, and
losing functions to the Council of Europe in the
1960s. The failure ofWEU to provide a structure of
response to the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia has often been
cited as the reason - at least for the British - for shut-
ting it down, although, as a clearly intergovernmen-
tal organisation with no military assets it is not clear
how else it could have been expected to respond to
post-cold war challenges.
The asset stripping, or cannibalising exercise
that has gone on over the past eighteen months is
curious. It is not clear what outcome is actually in-
tended, nor what future its important and ambitious
Article V will have. Until the Feira Council in 2000,
little attention had been paid to the outreach work
that WEU has done. Its Assembly will, in the longer
term, probably be shut down, while the satellite cen-
tre and the Institute of Security Studies will be trans-
ferred into the ED. Amongst the. most important of
its legacies will be the Petersberg Tasks. It can be
seen as representing much of what is still very un-
certain about the direction of recent events: it had
become the forum for the long-standing, and unre-
solved dialogue between France and Britain about
relations between European states and NATO/ the
US. It performed quiet security and confidence-build-
ing functions through its post-cold war associate
partnership scheme, and acted as an institutional
buffer between the EU and NATO in the defence/
security' shadow boxing' that has characterised much
of the cold and post-cold war periods. The prospect
of the end of WEU as a functioning international
institution means the direct institutional interface
between the EU and NATO has now to be addressed.
Until now, this has been protected by the civilian
status of the EU, and the presence, however weak,
ofWEU as a shock absorber, whose value may only




Neither can it be assumed that the future rela-
tionship of the EU with the Council of Europe will
remain static. The current discussion on the Human
Rights Convention and the EU's Charter of Human
Rights agreed at the Nice Summit has, for the mo-
ment, been considered in the light of whether the
EU can! should accede as an institution to the Con-
vention. However, the EU's Copenhagen Criteria for
applicants, and the insertion of the Convention into
the national legal regimes of most EU member states
must in time give rise to speculation about the longer-
term future of the Council of Europe as a separate
institution. The same cannot be said of the OSCE at
this stage, although, in ex-Yugoslavia, its weaknesses
have been made very apparent.
8. NATO
In the introduction, I argued that we might be
witnessing the messy birth of a post-cold war pan
European defence and security regime with organi-
sations based around NATO and the EU, but at the
moment, the relationship with NATO is complex and
turbulent. Tensions have run high over the last eight-
een months both in Brussels and in national capi-
tals, and the overlap between the organisations, and
that between leading states within the organisations
is complex. This will no doubt be more fraught when
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the Bush administration takes office in the US. The
relationship between NATO and the EU has had a
substantial ingredient of competitiveness since the
end of the cold war, despite declarations of coopera-
tion, their mutual interests, and their similar value
structures.
The role specialisation of the cold war has
disappeared: both now aspire to military security
functions (CJTFs and MSP), and a collective! coop-
erative security agenda; both are engaged in enlarge-
ment programmes. The St Malo declaration was, ini-
tially badly received by the six non-EU NATO mem-
bers, with responses ranging from Madeleine
Albright's broadside in the Financial Times, to Tur-
key's threats and difficult stance post-Nice, and Cana-
da's lament that it was the Seventh member of the
Six non-EU NATO members. Public and private dis-
cussions have ranged beyond the Peters berg tasks to
the general direction of EU-NATO relations, US re-
lations with European powers, procurement ques-
tions, and the general health of the Atlantic Alliance.
The pressures for administrative reform are
far greater for the EU than they are for NATO, for
the civilian culture and relative openness ofEU de-
cision-making contrast with NATO. Solana's ap-
pointment as Secretary-General of WEU as well as
M. PESC has been intended to assist the change, and
WEU officials have been closely involved with the
EU, weaving a path between military representatives,
with their own culture, and the EU and Pillar II offi-
cials. (It is not clear how well informed national
ministries of defence are about the EU). Double
hatting is widely practised on the new military com-
mittees, and there are complaints that the EU is im-
porting the secrecy of decision-making associated
with NATO, while there are also complaints that the
culture of the EU, and its lack of administrative se-
curity, makes the sharing of confidential informa-
tion hard. Decision-making in NATO itself will also
have to change, if the interface between the two is to
be effective. To date, the policy questions, and the
relationship with national foreign policy making and
the CFSP is still undeveloped, and the administra-
tive reforms are taking place in something of a
vacuum. Indeed, as General Sir Rupert Smith recently
remarked, NATO will have to derive its actions from
CFSP - as it, alone, has no 'strategy'.
At the level of capabilities and the parallel
processes of the DCI and the creation of the MSP,
problems also exist, not least because of the pres-
sures that reforms have put upon national ministries
of defence. However, the MSP must now been wo-
ven in as part of the part of NATO restructuring.
There remains a very serious question about role
specialisation between EU countries, and between
NATO and the EU. This is why the satellite debate
is so significant. A gendarmerie model for EU is
perhaps inevitable at least in the short run, with the
more technical and expensive contribution coming
from the US. This would mean that peacemaking, as
opposed to policing, civilian control and humanitar-
ian rescue type operations would reside in the fore-
seeable future with NATO! CJTFs.
Enlargement has exposed graphically the un-
easy sharing of terrain of the EU and NATO. As the
cold war ended, it seemed as if the Europe's day had
come, and that NATO would weaken, if not wither.
Both institutions set up association schemes - Asso-
ciate Membership and NACC (now EAPC) and PiP.
Given its less dense institutional structure and its
stronger leadership structure, NATO enlarged first,
reflecting the historical pattern of other, non-neutral
enlargements. The mess that remains may convey
security through the expectation of membership of
one organisation or the other, or both. However, it is
likely that enlargement will not remain on the Euro-
pean agenda for a very long time, and will play into
the security debate in ways that range from decision-
making, possibly through to applicants being recipi-
ents of intervention under Petersberg task security.
9. Euro-Atlantic relations
This inter-institutional debate has been con-
ducted in parallel with one about Euro-Atlantic rela-
tions, and particularly the role of the US in sustain-
ing and promoting security both in Europe (in its
widest sense), and beyond. We can identify two con-
tradictory trends. The first - transatlantic drift - is
essentially based upon the premise that the interna-
tional structural underpinning of the cold war will,
over time, be eroded, in part by this initiative. In-
stead of a more mature relationship between the US
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10. The risks of failureand its European partners, the Europeans will instead
see the parallel work done to re-invent NATO as in-
stitutional floundering. The US will therefore slip
into indifference to European security issues, and
concentrate its energies upon its autonomous role,
and, indeed, to NMD. This view is reflected in the
current preoccupation with a shifting attitude in the
US towards international institutions generally, per-
haps a sense that the US is too big for positive mem-
bership of international institutions, fears military
overstretch, and is driven by the constraints of do-
mestic and particularly US Congress politics. Trans-
atlantic drift raises the question of whether NATO
can only work when there is strong American lead-
ership.
A second perspective is that of increased trans-
atlantic participation: that institutional change may
give the US an even stronger presence in Europe,
leading perhaps to some kind of convergence be-
tween EU and NATO membership - a Transatlantic
defence and security community. NATO parliamen-
tarians have been invited to sit in on EP sessions and
certain European players are even toying with the
idea of offering a seat to NATO at some of the EU
Council meetings concerned with the new security
policy. Second, in policy terms, it is almost impossi-
ble to think of a Peters berg type task over which the
US would not wish to keep a droit de regard, espe-
cially if US equipment was being lent or leased for
such a task. He who pays the piper, calls the tune.
Third is anticipation that US economic interests, and
in particular those in the armaments sphere, will
dominate any exclusively European armaments pro-
vision, and thereby flood the market with American
products, with an inevitable extension of their lever-
age. This scenario is both favoured and feared in
Europe. Such fear has underpinned much of French
thinking on this subject since 1998. Some French
analysts have seen the US as becoming an
'hyperpuissance ', and of exercising unrestrained
power across the international system. However,
whether individual states still fear each other more
than the US remains to be seen. So, from a European
perspective, the working relationship with the US
remains redolent with practical and political
landmines. One senior interviewee said that, in Wash-
ington, half the administration feels that the MSP
will destroy NATO: the other half that, without MSP,
NATO will die.
It is argued above that the St Malo project, if
it is to be effective, and taking into consideration the
indivisible nature of security issues, could take a
central role within the'El.I's institutions. However, it
could yet collapse. As with all integrative enterprises
in a changing international environment, political will
is the key. St Malo may become impossible to
operationalise if states are now unable or unwilling
to support words with deeds - or capabilities. The
bargain struck has many weaknesses, and is in no
sense rock solid. State support, as well as institu-
tional vigour remains essential. In particular, it is
unlikely that more cuts in national defence spending
would be possible while the MSP pledges were be-
ing agreed, yet existing budgets are under pressure.
There are currently about 28,000 EU troops in KFOR,
and another 12,000 in SFOR, which makes for a size-
able EU contribution to Petersberg type peacekeep-
ing tasks that is already in the field.
The St Malo project could be prone to hijack
by those countries which are in both EU and NATO
but which disapprove of any decision to use force,
or who wish to use agreement as a bargaining chip
for other policy outcomes that they seek. Consent
by non-EU NATO members might take time, and not
be easily achieved. The backing of the US has been
muted thus far, and will always have to be worked
at, not least because the option of withdrawal of US
intelligence support facilities could impede the ac-
tive promulgation of certain types of Peters berg ac-
tivities. Given the voluntaristic rather than automatic
nature of the Petersberg tasks and the difficulties
associated with identifying and prioritising these
tasks, securing consensus from the key players in
the EU and!or NATO cannot always be assumed. The
complications for decision-making in the EU have
been highlighted above - and it would be deeply
ironic if the EU were to discover that it has closed
down the over-complex WEU only to mimic its com-
plexities within the EU. Yet it remains clear that,
even if the 2003 deadline is not met the scope of the
EU as a security actor has changed, and that its rela-
tions, and those ofthe key EU/ NATO member states
will not be the same again. •
